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Sanctions for Nuclear Inhibition: 
Comparing Sanction Conditions between 
Iran and North Korea
Inwook Kim and Jung-Chul Lee
When do sanctions succeed in nuclear inhibition? Is there 
a generalizable framework to estimate sanction effective-
ness against nuclear aspirants? Instead of relying on partial 
equilibrium analysis, we conceptualize sanctions as three 
sequential phases—imposition of economic pain, conversa-
tion to political pressure, and creation (or failure thereof) 
of zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). The effectiveness of 
each phase is subject to phase-specific contextual variables, 
an aggregation of which helps measure individual sanction’s 
effectiveness, conduct cross-case comparison, and estimate 
one’s replicability in other cases. To illustrate its analytical 
utility, we analyze the divergent sanction outcomes between 
Iran in 2012–2015 and North Korea in 2013–2017. Iran was 
economically more vulnerable and politically less resilient, 
and its bargaining position was closer to a ZOPA than North 
Korea was. Our analysis questions the utility of economic 
sanctions against North Korea and helps expand the discus-
sion away from the policy obsession with the role of China. 
Theoretically, it rectifies an imbalance against qualitative 
and holistic approach in the sanction literature and contrib-
utes to discussions about nuclear inhibition strategies. 
Keywords: economic sanction, nuclear proliferation, North 
Korea, Iran, US foreign policy.
When do sanctions succeed in nuclear inhibition? designed to raise 
economic cost of continuing a nuclear program, sanctions have been 
widely employed as an inhibition strategy against nuclear aspirants 
(Solingen 2012; Miller 2014). Contrary to its prominence and frequen-
cy in nonproliferation strategy, however, the literature surprisingly lacks 
in-depth discussions on basic questions about how and when sanctions 
are effective in stopping nuclear programs. Why do similarly designed 
sanctions yield divergent results across proliferation cases? How do we 
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measure replicability of sanction success to other nuclear aspirants? Is 
there a generalizable analytical framework to estimate sanction effec-
tiveness? 
To capture the relationship between sanctions and nonproliferation 
in a systematic and organized manner, we put forward a sequential mod-
el that conceptualizes three distinct phases with which a sanction com-
pels nuclear rollback. The model sets off with the phase of imposing 
economic pain, followed by its conversion to political coercive pressure, 
and ends with creation (or a failure thereof) of zone of possible agree-
ment (ZOPA). The effectiveness of each phase is subject to phase-spe-
cific contextual variables, which depending on their values magnify or 
dampen the operation of each phase, and therefore the sanction effec-
tiveness overall. 
By extensively consulting the existing literature, we identify a series 
of factors relevant to sanction effectiveness and organize them accord-
ing to the three phases. First, the severity of economic pain is a function 
of comprehensiveness of sanction, the target’s dependence on trade, and 
participation of major trading partners. Economic disruption is not an 
end in itself, however, but a means to pressure the target regime. The 
second phase, therefore, is defined by how well economic pain gets con-
verted into political coercive pressure onto the target regime. Here, the 
speed and magnitude of such conversion are determined by three vari-
ables—the size of winning coalition, institutional mechanisms for lead-
ership change, and strategic orientation of patron states. Last, whether 
political pressure is sufficient to create ZOPA hinges on the existing cost 
of striking a bargain for both sender and target states. We posit two such 
factors—the level of nuclear technology and the availability of passive 
economic carrots—to analyze the final phase of economic sanction. The 
sequential model captures sanction initiation to outcome, systematical-
ly maps and organizes widely acknowledged relevant conditions, and 
therefore helps identify points of the sanction operation that are particu-
larly conducive or detrimental to sanction effectiveness.
Using the sequential model, we conduct an in-depth cross case 
study on sanction conditions between the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
2012–2015 and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or 
North Korea) in 2013–2017. The two share a number of features, many 
of which have been pinpointed to be statistically significant to sanction 
effectiveness, such as the coverage and severity of sanction (Dashti-Gib-
son, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Hufbauer et al. 2007), a level of trade 
dependence, the nature of sender-target relations (Bonetti 1998; Drezner 
1999), the target’s regime type (Allen 2008), and the nature of compel-
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lence demand (Solingen 2012). Indeed, the design and rationale of the 
sanctions on Pyongyang has been frequently referenced to the success 
of the Iran model, defined as maximal use of economic sticks to induce 
denuclearization. Yet, the contrast in outcomes could not be starker. In 
the case of the former, the 2012 sanction played a pivotal role in “re-
ducing the risk of destabilizing nuclear competition” (Statement from 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Specialists 2015) by forging the final Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action with Tehran in July 2015.1 On the other 
hand, a vicious and unending circle has been evident in the North Ko-
rean case whereby a nuclear test is followed by corresponding sanction, 
and responded to with yet another test. For the reasons discussed later, 
we are also skeptical that sanctions have been key to Pyongyang’s lat-
est apparent willingness to negotiate denuclearization with Washington. 
In accounting for the diametrically opposite outcome, the conven-
tional wisdom put heavy responsibility on China’s strategic reluctance 
to ratchet up and implement the sanctions (Haggard 2016). Implicitly 
assumed here is that China’s participation would have caused severe 
economic pain to Pyongyang comparable to that in Tehran, which then 
could have induced the abandonment of its nuclear program. However, 
an in-depth qualitative examination under the sequential model shows 
that China’s reluctance was only a part of sanction ineffectiveness. Three 
non-China factors are highlighted: Pyongyang’s political institutions are 
more insulated and resilient against economic hardship; North Korea’s 
fully developed nuclear program requires greater concessions from the 
United States; and lifting sanctions does not promise immediate and 
attractive economic benefits to Pyongyang the way it did to Tehran. 
Overall, Pyongyang fared worse on all three phases, and our analysis 
forwards pessimistic viewpoints on the utility of economic sanction for 
nuclear inhibition in North Korea.
The first section reviews the relevant literature and theorizes the 
sequential model by explicating each of the three phases in sanction 
operation. Next, we examine how Iran and North Korea fared in each 
phase by systematically comparing the relevant factors in order. The last 
section concludes with policy implications.
How Sanctions (Are Supposed to) Operate
The sanction literature is voluminous, initiated with an inquiry about 
overall utility of sanctions (Pape 1997; Drezner 2003; Hufbauer et al. 
2007) and proliferated with a long and rich list of conditions germane to 
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sanction performances (Drezner 2011; Bapat et al. 2013). The latter cat-
egory—motivated by the question of why some sanctions perform better 
than others—is more relevant in explaining the divergent outcomes than 
the former, which addresses how sanctions as a whole fare against other 
nuclear reversal tools such as international treaty, diplomacy, coercion, 
alliances and security guarantee, sabotage, and even threats of military 
strike (Gavin 2015, 11).
Although the vast literature left us with plentiful variables to work 
with, these individual variables identified by static, large-N, and partial 
equilibrium analysis—a dominant form of studying sanctions—are of 
limited analytical utility in scrutinizing individual sanctions compared 
to the universe of sanction cases. This is because how individual sanc-
tions perform is likely to be a product of multiple factors that simul-
taneously operate and interact, which the controlled statistical analy-
sis on the universe of sanction cases is necessarily and intendedly not 
equipped to make sense of. Similarly, two or more sanctions may differ 
in their performances not by a single factor, but out of competing forces 
from multiple factors.
As a consequence, the controlled nature and different model speci-
fications of these theoretical endeavors make it analytically challenging 
to pick relevant conditions and compare the two nuclear sanction cases 
in any theoretically rigorous manner. To overcome these challenges, we 
selectively employ ideas from the existing literature and deductively 
construct a model that conceptualizes an operation of economic sanction 
in its entirety. Combining and organizing different variables under a sin-
gle framework offers several analytical advantages. First of all, it helps 
us to track what went right and wrong and at which points. Second, it 
gives a comprehensive set of relevant criteria to assess the effectiveness 
of sanctions, which again is likely a product of multiple factors. Last, 
the framework allows systematic estimates of the replicability of one 
sanction’s success on other cases by exposing the similarities and differ-
ences in sanction conditions across two or more cases.
Setting Up the Sequential Model 
A sanction against a nuclear state is implemented because states could 
not find a mutually acceptable arrangement regarding the target’s nu-
clear program. The sanction, in turn, reveals the resolve of the sender 
(sanctioning) state to dismantle and the target (sanctioned) state to pre-
serve the nuclear program under dispute. Under the new information, 
Inwook Kim and Jung-Chul Lee 99
both actors adjust their behaviors accordingly, determining the sanc-
tion’s outcome. The sanction succeeds if the target complies with the 
sender’s demands for nuclear rollback. It fails if the sanction has little to 
no coercive effect in deterring the target’s nuclear aspirations. A negoti-
ated deal is possible if, under the new informational setting, both target 
and sender decide to strike a bargain. For a sanction to work, therefore, 
it has to change the target’s calculus and shift its perception about the 
value of its nuclear program. This section explains the three sequential 
phases by which this change occurs (or not) and posits variables rele-
vant to the operation of each phase, with which target states’ vulnerabil-
ity to sanction is determined.
First Phase—Imposition of Economic Cost
While sanctions can take different forms (Kirshner 1997), ultimately 
they are designed to begin by inflicting economic pain on a target state. 
They do so by disrupting its aid, finance, trade, or asset linkages to for-
eign economic entities. In an increasingly globalized arena of economic 
activities, cutting ties to international economic opportunities can poten-
tially inflict highly significant hardship on the target state. A sanction is 
likely to be more powerful with the increasing cost it could impose on 
the target (Bapat et al. 2013).
In essence, the target’s economic vulnerability is a function of three 
economic structural variables. First, the comprehensiveness of the sanc-
tion regime matters (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997). The lev-
el of sanctions widely differs, ranging from relatively minor bans—such 
as those on specific items of traded commodities or travel bans on des-
ignated individuals—to more ambitious and comprehensive bans such 
as embargoes on a target state’s overall trade or prohibition of a target’s 
financial transactions with the rest of the world. Economic suffering in-
creases as the economic sanction measures become more comprehen-
sive.
Second, a target’s economic vulnerability increases with its depen-
dence on trade (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997). Banning 
trade on self-sufficient economies will not do much damage, while for 
a country whose welfare and prosperity come from international trade, 
sanctions will have a greater effect.
Third, a target’s level of economic suffering is subject to the level of 
participation of its major trading partners (McLean and Whang 2010). 
In essence, the more participation the sanction mobilizes, the more eco-
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nomic pain it can exact. The long-term sustainability of sanctions is not 
a constant but a variable, as some sender states themselves may find the 
trade ban too costly to enforce (Bapat and Kwon 2015) or the divergent 
strategic priorities among a target’s major trading partners may under-
mine the cohesiveness of the sanction regime.
Second Phase—Conversion into Political  
Coercive Pressure
Resilience against sanctions is not only a function of the magnitude of 
economic pain (Renwick 1981). Indeed, the determination of whether 
to capitulate to economic sanctions is essentially a political and not an 
economic decision. For instance, although economic sanctions halved 
Iraq’s economy in the 1990s, it nevertheless failed to change Saddam 
Hussein’s behavior (Drezner 2011). Domestic institutional and interna-
tional strategic environments are what translate the economic impact 
into political coercive pressure and hence determine the target state’s 
political resilience against sanctions (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999). 
Whether this institutional transmission belt dampens or magnifies the 
effectiveness of sanction statecraft is subject to three noneconomic vari-
ables.
The first factor is the size of the winning coalition, defined as “a set 
of people who control enough other instruments of power to keep the 
leader in office” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005, 8). The size affects both the 
chance of the sanction hitting the welfare of the regime’s winning coa-
lition and the costs to counter the impact. Accordingly, an equal amount 
of economic pain does not necessarily become an equal amount of po-
litical pressure—regimes with large winning coalition are likely to face 
greater political pressure as the sanction subjects them to greater pros-
pects of their key supporters being harmed by the sanction and increases 
resources required to satisfy the material welfare of their principal sup-
porters. In contrast, small-sized winning coalitions are likely to suffer 
less and require less resources to maintain their material welfare, and 
hence likely feel less coherent political pressure (Lektzian and Souva 
2007).
The second factor is an institutional arrangement for leadership 
change. If the leadership is selected competitively on a regular basis 
(e.g., by election, party conference, etc.), the leadership will be more 
conscious of the economic welfare of its winning coalition. In the ab-
sence of such a mechanism, the threshold for a regime change is higher 
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and the target state’s leadership will remain more insulated from sanc-
tion-inflicted economic pain.
The third factor is the strategic orientation of the target’s patron 
states, through which the target state can judge the likely duration and 
severity of sanctions. This informs the target’s decision whether to en-
dure or submit to the sanction. Any belief, reasonable or blind, that the 
participants have divergent strategic priorities or that some are against 
regime-threatening sanctions will lead to an expectation that the mul-
tilateral sanction cannot go on indefinitely and likely to end up being 
short-term discomfort and not long-term agony. The resulting percep-
tion of the fragility of a sanction encourages the target leadership to 
endure the economic pain.
Third Phase—Creation of Zone of Possible 
Agreement (ZOPA)
Where a sanction ends up depends not only on how much pressure the 
sanction can exert on the target’s economy and the regime, but also on 
the cost of the concessions that at least one of the actors needs to make 
in order to reach ZOPA (Sebenius and Singh 2012–2013). For instance, 
if the sender and target are disagreeing on a relatively minor issue, the 
required economic pain does not need to be large to coerce the target’s 
compliance with the sender’s demands. If the range of disagreement is 
large, however, even a highly effective sanction may not be sufficient 
to induce a change in the target state’s nuclear behavior (Morgan and 
Schwebach 1997; Drury and Li 2006).
Two factors determine the cost of the concessions necessary to cre-
ate a ZOPA. One is the level of nuclear program development (Volpe 
2017). In short, the more developed the program, the costlier it is for 
the target state to comply with the sender’s demand for nuclear rollback. 
Nuclear rollback nullifies the target’s technological, financial, and po-
litical capital thus far invested in the development program. The target 
state with a more advanced nuclear program will, therefore, be more re-
luctant to agree to the nuclear rollback for it entails greater opportunity 
costs, and political and strategic risks.
It also depends on the amount of “passive carrots” available for a 
sender state to employ. Passive carrots refer to a set of economic ben-
efits that the sender state can provide without resorting to additional 
resources. In most cases, this means a simple removal of existing sanc-
tion measures, such as releasing frozen foreign assets or lifting a ban on 
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trade and financial transactions. If these passive carrots are sufficient for 
the target state to anticipate a chance of economic recovery and revival, 
then the chance for a negotiated deal increases as it will entail little cost 
for the sender to bear, while the target receives immediate and tangible 
economic benefits through resumed access to international trade and fi-
nance.
When the target state has reasons not to view the nuclear rollback 
as viable or attractive, the sender states may consider the option of of-
fering “active carrots,” or additional economic benefits in the form of 
economic aid, loans, investments, or even security assistance or guar-
antees. However, while this expands the scope for reaching ZOPA with 
the target state, the provision of active carrots is a costlier and usually 
more controversial option for the sender. Overall, the number of passive 
carrots a sender state possesses through sanction lifting also affects the 
degree of incompatibility between the states during the nuclear negoti-
ation.
Table 1 How Economic Sanctions Work
 First phase Second phase Third phase
Phase Imposition of  Conversion to political Creation of zone of 
 economic pain coercive pressure possible agreement  
   (ZOPA)
Variables (1) Comprehensiveness  (1) Size of winning (1) Level of nuclear 
 of sanction coalition technology
 (2) Target’s dependence (2) Institutional mechanism (2) Availability of 
 on trade for regime change passive economic
 (3) Participation of major  (3) Strategic orientation carrots 
 trading partners of patron states
Table 1 summarizes our framework, denoting the three phases and 
the determinants for the success of each phase. In short, a sanction is 
likely to work more effectively in favor of a sender’s demands if it can 
inflict greater economic pain (first phase), which gets converted more 
completely as political coercive pressure (second phase), and the bar-
gaining conditions between sender and target states are more compatible 
(third phase). Accordingly, sanction is more likely to compel nuclear in-
hibition based on the more economic pain it can exact, the more political 
challenges economic pain presents to the leadership, and when the price 
of striking a bargain is lower for sender and target states. Conversely, 
a sanction is less likely to succeed if the opposite conditions hold. In 
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other words, the target will stand firm on its nuclear program if it finds 
the economic pain caused by the sanction to be bearable, evadable, and/
or a short-term prospect; its own political institutions are resilient and 
insulated against economic hardship; and the bargaining objectives are 
too wide to be reconciled by the sanction.
Comparing Sanction Effectiveness between 
Iran and North Korea
Based on the framework set up above, this section conducts a theoret-
ically informed qualitative assessment of the relevant conditions sur-
rounding the sanctions on Tehran and Pyongyang. Doing so allows us 
to explain the success of the Iran sanctions in an organized way and to 
evaluate the replicability of their success in North Korea. Despite many 
apparent similarities, the evidence overall strongly suggests that North 
Korea fares far worse on all relevant variables, casting deep doubts on 
the Iran sanction’s replicability in North Korea.
First Phase: Imposition of Economic Cost
The evidence suggests that though the two nations are quite comparable 
in terms of the comprehensiveness of the sanction regime and the level 
of trade dependence, Tehran faced much more stringent and determined 
participation in the sanction by its major trading partners. This align-
ment of major powers’ strategic objectives was further enhanced by the 
exogenous shock of the shale oil revolution, which made sanctions more 
endurable for oil-importing sender states but more painful for oil-depen-
dent Iran.
Sanction Comprehensiveness: The 2012 Iran and 2016 North Korea 
sanctions are defined by two similarly stringent sets of sanction provi-
sions. One is an embargo on the target’s major export item. In the case 
of Iran, this item was crude oil, which made up 85 percent of its foreign 
exchange, 60 percent of government revenue, and 90 percent of export 
revenue (Farzanegan 2011). Via a series of sanctions in 2012, major oil 
importers joined in the previously implemented US sanction on Iran 
oil, with the EU immediately halting its 600,000 barrels per day of oil 
import entirely, which Japan and Korea also agreed to rapidly reduce 
(Katzman 2016). With their participation, the sanction on Iran oil was 
elevated from a mere US diplomatic statement to a truly substantive 
coercive measure.
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Similarly, North Korea’s mineral export, chiefly consisting of coal 
and iron ore, was put under stringent sanction measures with the UNSC 
2270 of March and UNSC 2321 of November in 2016. In 2015, their 
export value reportedly represented 47 percent of its $2.7 billion in to-
tal exports and 51 percent of its $2.5 billion exports to China, its larg-
est trading partner (KOTRA 2016). Sanction comprehensiveness was 
further enhanced by mandatory cargo inspections in and out of North 
Korea. Apparently defiant of sanctions, Pyongyang conducted further 
missile and nuclear tests in July and September 2017, after which UNSC 
2371, 2375, and 2397 were consequently imposed. Since UNSC 2321, 
the UN multilateral sanctions have not targeted just the regime but ex-
panded their scope to include the market economy by cutting crude and 
refined oil supply by 90 percent, now banning over 90 percent of North 
Korea’s official exports consisting of coal, textiles, iron, and other items 
and requiring North Korean workers’ expulsion within the next twen-
ty-four months (Haggard 2016; Byrne 2017; Macdonald 2017).
Another sanction measure that added a true sense of comprehen-
siveness was the erection of secondary sanctions, by which both Iran 
and North Korea were effectively blocked from conducting financial 
transactions with dollar-based international banking systems. In partic-
ular, by targeting financial institutions that are suspected of transacting 
with the target, the secondary sanctions put enormous constraints on the 
two states’ ability to find any willing international financial intermedi-
aries. For instance, this proved highly damaging for Iran when sanc-
tions included maritime insurance for shipping oil and petrochemicals. 
EU-headquartered maritime insurers covered at least 90 percent of Iran’s 
oil tanker trade and there were no immediately available alternative pro-
viders for oil shipping insurance (Economist 2012). North Korea was 
put under secondary sanctions through Executive Order 13722 in March 
15, 2016, under President Barack Obama, and another in September 21, 
2017, under President Donald Trump, which expanded the target to any 
individuals, banks, or companies that finance trade with North Korea. 
Trade Dependence: Due to the lack of data reliability, any estimate 
on Iran or North Korea’s trade dependence should be taken with great 
caution. The available estimates, however, indicate that in both coun-
tries, trade accounts for about 50 percent of their total GDP. One may 
note that oil revenue makes up by far the largest source of government 
income and therefore have always been central to the functioning of 
Iran’s political economy. In North Korea, the estimate of trade/GDP was 
as low as 15 percent in the late 1990s, but rose to around 46.2 percent 
(Kim 2017).2 The increase occurred as a result of the complete break-
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down of the public distribution system (PDS) in the late 1990s, and the 
resulting inflow of foreign aid and the expansion of trade with China and 
South Korea (Haggard and Noland 2010; Choi 2012).
Participation of Major Trading Partners: Although the form of 
an optimal sanction was made obvious by Iran’s well-known overre-
liance on oil, mobilization of multilateral support for banning Iranian 
oil presented huge policy challenges. Simply put, in the eyes of many 
interested outside parties, Iran’s oil was too strategically valuable, eco-
nomically critical, and commercially tempting to be removed from the 
supply chain—in 2011 Iran was producing around 2.5 million barrels 
per day, representing about 4 percent of the global supply. Its removal 
was expected to precipitate a sharp strain on the already tight global oil 
supply in 2011.
Indeed, the prospect of a high cost borne by importers created an 
initial skepticism about the 2012 sanction regime’s sustainability. For 
instance, Ali Moruri, the vice chair of the Majlis’ Energy Commission, 
declared that “the possibility of the elimination of Iran’s oil does not 
exist because the world needs Iran’s oil and Iran’s oil cannot be ignored” 
(Maloney 2015, 356). Khamenei similarly argued that “continuing these 
sanctions for a long time is not in the interest of western countries” (Ma-
loney 2014b). Analysts agreed—coupled with a decades-long history of 
Iran enduring economic sanctions, the political and economic environ-
ment appeared to favor Iran rather than the sanction regime (Takeyh and 
Maloney 2011).
However, initiatives for additional sanction measures gained mo-
mentum beginning in the late 2000s. First, following the revelation of 
a secret uranium enrichment facility near Qom and a report that Iran 
began enriching to 20 percent U-235 in the Natanz and Fordow plants in 
2010–2011, there was a renewed sense of urgency regarding the nuclear 
threat, particularly among the European Union. Second, the escalating 
nuclear tension was coupled with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 
disturbing and unacceptable rhetoric, such as his infamous Holocaust 
denial and his remark that “Israel must be wiped off the map of the 
world” (CNN 2005), all of which further tarnished Iran’s already bad 
international image. From the point of view of sanctions, the perception 
shift was a bit of unforeseen “luck” as the heightened political anxiety 
helped to initiate and mobilize multilateral efforts in ratcheting up sanc-
tions against Iran.
Third, and perhaps more significantly, a shale oil revolution had 
transformed the political economy of sanctions by lowering the cost of 
sanctions borne by oil-importing sender states. Almost by sheer seren-
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dipity, a rapid increase in shale oil production roughly coincided with 
the timing of the January 2012 economic sanctions, moving from about 
0.63 million barrels per day in January 2010 to 2.01 million barrels per 
day in June 2012. By the time of the July 2014 agreement, the volume 
stood at 3.91 million barrels per day (Energy Information Agency [EIA] 
2015). This volume of an additional 2 to 3 million barrels per day rough-
ly equaled the amount of supply loss from Iran, which meant that the 
West now could “put the squeeze on Iran without disrupting the global 
market or jacking up the price” (Philips 2013).
Overall, the strategic objectives of Iran’s trading partners became 
more or less aligned toward strict enforcement of sanctions, forged upon 
the shared growing concern and mistrust about Iran’s nuclear program 
and new shale oil dynamics that canceled out the effects of the loss of 
Iranian oil supply to the market. Eventually, the multilateral sanctions 
severely hampered the Iranian economy. Iran’s oil exports came down 
by 1 million barrels per day, leading a fall in its oil and gas export by 47 
percent from $118 billion in the 2011–2012 fiscal year to $63 billion just 
a year later, and then dropped even further to $56 billion the next year 
(EIA 2015). With the underperformance of its dominant industry, Iran’s 
GDP was contracted by 6 to 9 percent in 2012, its inflation reached 35 to 
40 percent in 2013, and its currency, the rial, depreciated by more than 
50 percent in 2013 (Economist 2016; Kwon 2016).
In contrast, the strategic priorities diverge widely among major 
trading partners with North Korea. The United States, South Korea, 
and Japan support sanctions, have instituted their own economic pun-
ishment, and closely cooperate on the North Korean nuclear issue. On 
the other hand, China’s commitment to sanctions is widely known to 
be indeterminate at best, an inevitable reality born out of China’s com-
plex strategic priority toward the Kim regime. It is true that Xi Jinping 
repeatedly showed his displeasure with the Pyongyang-sanctioned nu-
clear provocations, a trend that accelerated after North Korea’s purge 
of two top party officials in charge of the bilateral party relations, Jang 
Song-Taek in 2013 and Zhou Yongkang in 2014 (Lee and Kim 2015). 
Furthermore, to the surprise of many, China cooperated with the Unit-
ed States in drafting a series of increasingly harsher sanction regimes 
starting with UNSC 2270 and 2321 in 2016 and UNSC 2371, 2375, and 
2397 in 2017, which reportedly have tightened trade control.
A dominant view, however, holds that as onerous as North Korea is, 
Beijing is sharply opposed to further destabilization of Pyongyang for 
the strategic interest of keeping its buffer state secure and preventing a 
refugee crisis in the unwanted event of a sudden regime collapse. This 
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opposition was particularly strong when a regime change was openly 
discussed in Washington and Seoul. Furthermore, the Sino-DPRK alli-
ance carries diplomatic value in the management of Beijing-Washington 
relations. For instance, Xi Jinping received Ri Su-Yong, a vice chairman 
of the Korean Workers’ Party, in the midst of sanctions implementa-
tion in June 2016, following rising tensions with the United States in 
the South China Sea, signifying a possible departure from the sanctions 
regime should it find other US policies in the region to be hostile and 
unacceptable. Beijing’s stance has been invariably affected by other 
complicating issues such as the intensely controversial deployment of 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2016 and deteriorat-
ing trade tension with Washington in 2018.
The strategic complexity accounts for a series of sanction-evading 
measures as well as Pyongyang’s active search for alternative trade and 
financial arrangements. Against the mandate to inspect all cargo going 
in and out of North Korea, for example, trucks still passed through the 
bridges on the Sino-DPRK border without inspection (Perlez 2016). 
Illegal smuggling is rampant, a well-known combined product of de-
termined smugglers, corrupt officials, and the sheer difficulty of sanc-
tion enforcement with limited resources along this long, porous border. 
Previous sanctions have been reported to have deepened, not stifled, 
Sino-DPRK trade and commercial ties through an inadvertent improve-
ment in private procurement networks (Park 2014).
The incentives and resources to circumvent sanctions are prevalent 
and plentiful in Sino-DPRK economic relations. This has been, in an 
almost literal sense, fatal to the 2016 sanction regimes. Thanks to geo-
graphical proximity and historical ties, China forms by far North Ko-
rea’s largest economic partner. This trade dependence intensified during 
the 2000s, and approximately 90 percent of North Korea’s exports are 
destined for China. Unfortunately, China’s full commitment has been an 
elusive prospect under the current strategic landscape, severely under-
mining the credibility and sustainability of the 2016 sanctions.
Second Phase: Conversion to Political Pressure
Even if Pyongyang goes through suffering as equally painful as Tehran 
did, it does not guarantee a comparable nuclear deal. This is because 
whether economic pain becomes a political reality is ultimately contin-
gent upon the target state’s political will and its institutional ability to 
endure economic hardship. The comparative analysis of political setting 
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shows that Pyongyang can endure sanctions more resiliently than Teh-
ran could. The Kim regime relies on a smaller winning coalition, while 
a legitimate route for regime change is virtually nonexistent and China 
is strategically, though reluctantly, inclined to preserve rather than de-
stabilize the Kim regime. None of these factors existed in relation to 
the sanctions against Iran, which compelled the Iranian leadership to 
consider and act to promptly relieve the economic suffering.
Size of Winning Coalition Plus Institutional Mechanism for Re-
gime Change: Iran’s regime proved to be rather politically vulnerable 
to economic sufferings following the January 2012 sanctions, which hit 
Iran’s economy hard at an unprecedented level. Gauging Iran’s winning 
coalition size is challenging due to “a strange combination of remark-
able competitive election and harsh repression” (Plattner and Diamond 
2000). On balance, although the Iranian public does not form a credible 
winning coalition the same way that a fully democratic society allows, 
their power to elect the president, members of Majlis, and the Assembly 
of Experts on a regular and fairly competitive basis makes them relevant 
in the making of Iranian domestic and foreign policy. As a seasoned 
observer of Iranian politics notes,
When visualizing how decisions are made in Tehran, I picture fifteen 
bearded men sitting around a long table, with Khamenei seated at the 
head . . . the election of a more moderate president could change the make-
up of who sits at that table . . . you could have five or six people advo-
cating less strident domestic and foreign policies. Their impact won’t be 
enormous, but it would not be negligible. (Sadjadpour 2009) 
Accordingly, it is hard not to emphasize the significance of two 
elections held after the 2012 sanctions. The first was the presidential 
election of 2013, when reformist politician Hassan Rouhani was elected 
to be the new president, a result that reflected growing frustration with 
Iran’s economic underperformance and the public’s desire to ease the 
sanctions and speed the overall recovery of Iran’s economy. The elec-
tion result sent a credible signal to outside nations about Iran’s desire to 
reopen and expedite the nuclear negotiation. Soon after the election, the 
interim agreement materialized in November 2013.
Following this were two national elections—for the Majlis and 
the Assembly of Experts—scheduled in 2016. The upcoming elections 
effectively served as a deadline for Iranian negotiators (Zarif 2015), 
before which Rouhani’s administration had to present tangible results 
in support of the ongoing nuclear negotiation. Combined with an in-
Inwook Kim and Jung-Chul Lee 109
creasingly crippled economy, the election schedules made the political 
necessity to strike a deal more urgent in Tehran than in Washington (Na-
der 2014). In short, the 2016 elections had an effect of tying the hands 
of the Iranian negotiators—without securing an acceptable deal with 
the United States, Rouhani’s domestic standing would have weakened, 
while paving the way for hard liners’ comeback to the Iranian political 
landscape (Adebahr 2014).
The contrast is nothing but stark in North Korea. Given the noto-
rious opacity of its domestic politics, the size and composition of the 
winning coalition is anyone’s guess. And yet, given the absence of any 
regularized and competitive leadership selection process, there is broad 
consensus that the winning coalition is limited to a small number of 
elites, with estimates ranging from several thousand to the Pyongyang 
population of four to five million (Byman and Lind 2010; Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith 2011; Kang 2011–2012). While members of the 
Korean Workers’ Party, military officers, and bureaucrats typically form 
the central pillars of the winning coalition, the number of those in the 
winning coalition appears to be shrinking even further, driven by the 
marginalization of the military. Recent developments such as Kim Jong-
un’s repeated purges of military generals since 2011, the reinstatement 
of the Korean Workers’ Party in the Seventh Party Congress, and the 
creation of a new organ, the State Affairs Commission, all appear to sup-
port this hypothesis. On the other hand, the ordinary populace lacks any 
legitimate channels to express social and economic grievances. Further-
more, hereditary succession is the de facto rule for leadership changes 
in North Korea. The power and wealth of the country are passed down 
through generations, while its social hierarchy and ideological indoctri-
nation continually inhibit popular capacity to organize systematic resis-
tance against poverty and repression.
Since Kim’s political survival primarily hinges on the welfare of 
his small winning coalition, if a sanction dries up the resources for dis-
tribution, Kim’s rational course of action is to marshal and allocate the 
remaining resources to the ruling elites at the expense and impoverish-
ment of the general public. For instance, the dead and other victims of 
the infamous 1990s famine were disproportionately concentrated in the 
poorest provinces, such as North Hamgyong, and in the weakest and 
most politically vulnerable populations. Insofar as the regime’s political 
survival is concerned, the mass suffering was a necessary price to pre-
serve precious resources for the winning coalition. Sanctions that target 
the elites themselves, such as blacklisting individuals or banning the 
import of luxury goods, are unlikely to succeed because the political 
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fate of these elites is, in effect, already tied to the fate of Kim Jong-un. 
Indeed, if the leader can give privileges to the members of his winning 
coalition in times of severe economic hardship, it might even enhance 
the dependence of these select groups of people on Kim’s personal lead-
ership (Byman and Lind 2010).
Overall, despite their oft-assumed shared authoritarian nature, Teh-
ran and Pyongyang politics operate in vastly different ways. Tehran pol-
itics have been shown to be considerably responsive to sanction-origi-
nated economic hardships, as the political success of President Rouhani 
and the reformist faction was predicated upon winning the support of 
those voters who were “far more focused on their day-to-day economic 
needs . . . and (not) united behind the government’s nuclear ambition” 
(Sadjadpour 2006). No comparable accountability exists in Pyongyang. 
Kim’s political survival requires fewer resources. The absence of in-
stitutional mechanisms to challenge, let alone change, the leadership 
means there is no political deadline to meet as far as nuclear negotiation 
is concerned. Political sensitivity is evidently much higher in Tehran 
politics than in Pyongyang.
Strategic Orientation of Patron States: It is very likely that Iran 
viewed the strategic orientation of major powers as unfavorable. Indeed, 
no sustained support, either explicit or implicit, was available during the 
period of economic sanction. China, despite seeing Iran as an attractive 
oil-rich partner in light of the rising oil price, soaring domestic demand, 
and strategic vulnerability to access to oil, decided not to purchase Iran’s 
oil fields or to increase its oil import volume, all of which were oppor-
tunities created by the sanction. At the end, China’s interest in Iran was 
more limited, geographically distant, and commercial in nature, while 
China’s top policy agenda always and still resides in its bilateral re-
lationship with the United States. The exploitation of commercial op-
portunities in Iran was simply deemed not worth the cost of probable 
deterioration in US-China relations (Downs and Maloney 2011).
Similarly, the proclivity of Russia’s foreign policy, potentially 
friendly, was also against wrecking the nuclear deal. Initially, many 
raised the possibility of strategic alignment between Iran and Russia, 
who once declared the sanction “unacceptable” and that Iran “has the 
right to peaceful use of atomic energy, including enrichment operations” 
(RT 2013). The concern intensified with their shared foreign policy ob-
jectives in Syria and its sharp tension over the Ukraine crisis with the 
United States. At the end, however, Russia recognized the danger of 
Iran’s nuclear threat to the region and a lack of alternative solution to the 
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problem, while its economic stakes in the trade with Iran were meager 
and the regime stability of the theocratic state were not a game changer 
for Russia’s core foreign policy objectives (Maloney 2014a). Investing 
its own diplomatic capital to support the unpopular and dangerous Iran 
regime did not warrant all political backlash it would additionally create 
against Moscow.
The absence of major stakeholders friendly to Iran favored an emer-
gence of an active “honest broker,” a role assumed by the European 
Union. The EU is a bloc friendly to the United States but also with a 
rich history of interaction with Iran. The European public was also in-
different and far from hostile in comparison to the United States, which 
in turn created room for diplomatic flexibility during the negotiations 
(Adebahr 2015). The sustained presence of an “honest broker” may not 
have predetermined success of the nuclear negotiations, but was highly 
facilitative of it (Sherman 2015).
In contrast, none of the international strategic environment vari-
ables favored the sanction regime against Pyongyang. The central factor 
is the strategic orientation of China. China is a major stakeholder in 
North Korea’s regime, to whom China allegedly gives priority in the 
prevention of economic collapse over Pyongyang’s nuclear prolifera-
tion program. The aforementioned halfhearted enforcement of sanctions 
already raised suspicion that “China will squeeze for a little bit, but 
not too hard” (Morello and Mufson 2016). The two Xi-Kim summits 
in March and May 2018 strongly suggest that China’s commitment to 
the sanction is by no means assured but ambiguous. From Pyongyang’s 
perspective, the sanction regime, absent any credible honest broker and 
filled with major stakeholders with divergent strategic objectives, re-
inforces doubts about the sanction’s long-term sustainability and room 
for diplomatic maneuvering to minimize the sanction’s adverse conse-
quences.
Between Tehran and Pyongyang, the international settings are not 
alike. The absence of any sympathetic patrons left little room for Tehran 
to exploit against the sanction’s sustainability. In contrast, Pyongyang 
is well aware of China’s strategic inclination to preserve rather than de-
stabilize the Kim regime. This creates room for sanction fragility in the 
medium term, and naturally one rational course of available action is to 
continue its nuclear program, wait for the sanctions to break down, and 
enjoy a better bargaining position in the future.
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Third Phase: Creation of Zone of Possible 
Agreement
The last phase concerns whether ZOPA now exists after calculating the 
impact of sanctions. From the target state’s point of view, the cost of 
withstanding the sanctions must be balanced by the cost of making con-
cessions. The sender states similarly must consider the cost of striking a 
bargain. Unfortunately, the comparison of the two factors—the level of 
nuclear development and the economic carrots available—again lends 
support for pessimistic assessment on the replicability of the Iran deal 
in North Korea. North Korea’s nuclear program is much more advanced 
than Iran’s, so a rollback represents a larger concession for Pyongyang. 
On the other hand, the sanctions removal alone is unlikely to be as pow-
erful a carrot to induce denuclearization as was the case with Iran. This 
greater degree of incompatibility makes ZOPA harder to reach under the 
current conditions of US–North Korea relations.
Level of Nuclear Development: First, in terms of nuclear develop-
ment, the difference in the level of nuclear weaponization is nothing 
less than staggering. On the one hand, despite the development of ex-
tensive nuclear fuel cycles in the 2000s, Iran still fell short of enriching 
uranium to weapons grade amid the nuclear negotiations. Although the 
shortening “breakout time” for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon creat-
ed a sense of urgency for the US negotiators, what needed to be done 
to credibly dismantle its weaponization program nevertheless did not 
require unmanageably extensive rollbacks. In other words, the zone of a 
mutually agreeable solution was not far from the realities on the ground.
This is not the case in North Korea. While the details and history 
of its nuclear development and international responses are well docu-
mented and need no repetition here, what distinguishes North Korea 
from Iran is that since withdrawing itself from the Nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty (NPT) in 2003, Pyongyang has gone well past the stage 
of enriching uranium and plutonium to weapons grade and has already 
conducted six nuclear tests. Its missile programs also have achieved sig-
nificant progress in increasing the ranges of ICBMs and diversifying the 
launching methods by continuing SLBM tests.
Though the exact level of its nuclear and missile technology is a 
topic of ongoing controversy, for the purposes of this article, it is suffi-
cient to say that unlike Iran, North Korea is estimated to have produced 
enough fissile material to build thirty to sixty nuclear weapons and has 
assembled ten to twenty already (Kristensen and Norris 2018). In terms 
of bargaining prospects, what Pyongyang has developed is far above 
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where the United States wants its nuclear program to be—“comprehen-
sive, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID).” This increased 
distance introduces a great deal of complication and challenges for a ne-
gotiated settlement to be reached. Indeed, the history of the North Korea 
nuclear program had been a much fiercer and ultimately unsuccessful 
struggle to decide how far, at what speed, and under which conditions 
North Korea should dismantle its nuclear capabilities.
Amount of Passive Economic Carrots: The United States possessed 
enough “passive carrots” to lure Iran to the negotiation table and ulti-
mately to acceptance of a nuclear rollback. These passive carrots were 
the combined product of the historical legacy of Iran’s extensive linkage 
to international finance during the Shah period and the inseparable ties 
of its oil industries to the global economy. Accordingly, the removal of 
these sanctions could deliver immediate and substantial monetary and 
trade benefits. For instance, approximately $120 billion worth of Iran’s 
foreign assets were held frozen under the sanctions (Katzman 2016). 
In addition, sanctions on Iranian oil exports are estimated to have cost 
$160 billion in oil revenue since 2012 (Katzman 2016), while its oil 
fields were becoming increasingly obsolete and its industry was report-
ed to have needed around $150 to $400 billion in investments in order to 
modernize its oil installations (Erdbrink 2016; Katzman 2016).
These trade opportunities and financial resources were immediately 
collectible following the removal of sanctions and were vital for Iran’s 
economic recovery. Such a financial situation meant that the United 
States’ lifting of sanctions alone could be a workable and meaningful 
carrot for Iran. Indeed, Foreign Minister Zarif remarked in 2014, “All 
that the United States needs to do is to get an agreement that can lead to 
the removal of sanctions. There is nothing else that we’re asking the US 
to do. We are not asking for security guarantees, we are not asking for 
any money, we are not asking the United States to do anything—simply 
to remove the sanctions” (Zarif 2014).
From the US perspective, simple removal of the sanctions is a pas-
sive carrot, meaning that the United States does not need to spend any of 
its own resources. One should note, however, that a decision may entail 
reputation cost against the credibility of future US foreign policy, and 
therefore cannot be assumed to be entirely costless. Still, the sanctions’ 
vitality in Iran’s economic recovery and the relatively inexpensive na-
ture of removing it make them quite compatible, or at least worthy of 
serious negotiation in search of mutually acceptable terms.
In contrast, both North Korea’s economic realities and its strategic 
concerns indicate that the amount of passive carrots the United States 
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possesses is unlikely to meet Pyongyang’s expected return for giving up 
or even halting its nuclear program (Haggard 2016). The North Korean 
economy lacks adequate infrastructure to quickly recover and was never 
quite prosperous even prior to the sanctions. The acceptance of passive 
carrots accordingly does not quite promise tangible economic benefits 
at all, while rolling back its nuclear program represents an immediate 
loss of security. Cognizant of the limitations, the previous nuclear ne-
gotiations involved provision of active carrots such as aid, infrastruc-
ture building, or even security assurance in return for implementation of 
counterproliferation measures. However, along with Pyongyang’s con-
tinuing nuclear program, these policies became increasingly controver-
sial as well as politically costly among sender states such as the United 
States, South Korea, and Japan. Consequently, the lack of cheap carrots 
and the aversion to use of active carrots further shrank the bargaining 
space in the negotiation with Pyongyang. 
The Way Forward
Evidence is clear and indisputable—the Iran sanctions operated under 
unusually favorable conditions, defined by Iran’s economic vulnerabil-
ity that was further exacerbated by unforeseen flooding of shale oil into 
the global oil supply chain, its institutional exposure to general econom-
ic pain, and the relatively low cost of concessions required for both Iran 
and the United States to strike a bargain. What is more striking is the 
sanction outcome. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action mandates a 
significant rollback to Iran’s nuclear program but not a CVID. Accord-
ingly, Tehran maintains a stockpile of low-enriched uranium (under 3.67 
percent), and most measures run for only ten to fifteen years. Applied 
to the sanction conditions against North Korea and the current nuclear 
inhibition strategy, a major takeaway from Iran’s experience, therefore, 
is that economic sanctions alone are unlikely to induce a CVID in North 
Korea. The highly intrusive sanction measures were constantly impaired 
by China’s questionable commitment to strangulation of its treaty ally. 
Moreover, Pyongyang is institutionally more insulated from economic 
isolation and impoverishment—its small-sized winning coalition dic-
tates that as long as the Kim regime can sufficiently distribute private 
goods, the core of the regime can stay stable and intact. Last, Pyong-
yang’s more advanced nuclear program and the needs for active car-
rots from the United States require larger concessions from both parties, 
complicating further the task of reaching ZOPA.
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Despite these wide-ranging differences, a belief in the replicability 
of sanction success in North Korea was still plentiful in policy circles 
in Washington. Kurt Campbell, a former assistant secretary of state for 
East Asian and Pacific affairs, for instance, noted that “some senior US 
officials” are calling for secondary sanctions like the one that “success-
fully brought to bear on Iran” against Chinese banks doing business 
with North Korea (Time 2017). Just days before imposing the latest 
secondary sanctions in September 2017, Steven Mnuchin, the Treasury 
secretary, said, “These sanctions work. They worked with Iran. . . . And 
in North Korea, economic warfare works” (CNBC 2017), highly indica-
tive of the motivation to ban financial transaction with Pyongyang.
The sequential model put strong doubt over the wisdom behind 
such a belief. In fact, an immediate implication of this analysis is that 
sanctions are unlikely to succeed in CVID because conditions that made 
the Iran nuclear deal possible are distinctly lacking in North Korea. Too 
often ostensible similarities across cases of different time and region 
create a false sense of one case’s replicability in the other. Applying 
a one-size-fits-all approach by the international community, usually a 
product of a lack of appreciation for contextual differences across cases, 
is a common practice. Such a myth has long persisted in Washington, 
Seoul, and Tokyo. The sequential model addressed this flawed view by 
identifying points of the divergence and, by extension, deconstructed 
the false belief in the Iran sanction success replicability.
With such a viewpoint, we are skeptical that sanctions were behind 
Kim Jong-un’s recent apparent willingness to negotiate “denucleariza-
tion.” First of all, only with UNSC 2375 and 2397 have UN sanctions 
finally acquired any real potential to hurt the North Korean economy 
more so than they did in Iran. However, key moments in 2018, such as 
Kim’s New Year’s speech in January and his meeting with the South 
Korean delegation in Pyongyang in March, during which for the first 
time he indicated willingness to relinquish nuclear weapons, came after 
only three and six months, respectively, after UNSC 2375. The short 
time makes it unreasonable to assume that the sanctions forced Kim to 
make such a shift.
Alternatively, others posit that the crippling prospect of sanctions 
drove the change. This is based on two highly demanding assump-
tions—China’s faithful implementation of sanctions for a sustained pe-
riod and the regime’s institutional vulnerability from general economic 
hardship. Neither is easily achievable in practice. The former assumes 
China’s willingness to accept the strangulating consequences of sanc-
tions that potentially jeopardize its historical interests not to trigger a 
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regime collapse. Furthermore, seeing sanctions as a defining and dura-
ble feature of Beijing’s policy to Pyongyang is too simplistic, missing 
the multidimensional pillars that form complex calculus and perceptions 
in the bilateral relations. The Kim-Xi summits in March and May 2018 
were instructive and signified a historical and ideological solidarity that 
the two could return, celebrate, and rejuvenate.
The latter is also problematic. Though Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy 
arguably hinges more on economic performance today than before, 
we remain skeptical that economic pain would easily translate into re-
gime-threatening political pressure. In addition to the aforementioned 
factors, North Korea critically lacks experiences of political protest, let 
alone mobilization. It is one thing to feel upset about deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions, but quite another to organize a sizeable and sustained 
political protest under regimes like North Korea. Relying on economic 
pains to compel fundamental political concessions under these circum-
stances appears to be a distant prospect and wishful thinking at best.
Second, it is growingly evident that Pyongyang sees the negotia-
tions primarily as a security deal with the United States more so than 
an opportunity to lift economic sanctions. South Korea’s Moon Jae-in 
administration sensed Pyongyang’s urge for a security deal and sought 
a mediation between Pyongyang and Washington. According to an in-
ternal source, for instance, a critical moment occurred on December 19, 
2017, when Moon Jae-in revealed that he “made . . . suggestions [to 
postpone the joint military drills] to the US and the US is currently re-
viewing it” (Engel and Werner 2017), despite knowing the presentation 
of a new sanction resolution a few days later in the UN. Arguably, this 
averted Pyongyang’s usual follow-up provocations and instead main-
tained the momentum toward a conciliatory New Year’s speech on Janu-
ary 1, 2018. Concrete steps in security issues were likely what prompted 
Kim’s shift to dialogue, not a hint to remove the sanctions.
Furthermore, Pyongyang’s demands for “phased” and “synchro-
nized” denuclearization reiterate its long-standing call for a securi-
ty-to-security exchange whose history dates to well before the latest im-
plementation of sanctions (Haggard 2016, 957–958). What Pyongyang 
seeks to negotiate represents a continuation of the pre-2016 sanction 
bargaining process, not a fresh start compelled by the latest sanction 
measures. Sanctions may have added further rationale for negotiation, 
but examination of circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that the 
fundamental driver was and remains Pyongyang’s search for security. 
This is where the Moon administration has sought to create a new ZOPA 
whereby an ending of the armistice and possibility of a peace treaty 
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were put at the beginning of negotiations, a feature exogenous to the 
sanction regime.
It is important to emphasize that we are not denying the utility of 
sanctions entirely. They can serve other valuable functions such as pun-
ishing proliferation behavior, enhancing a bargaining position vis-à-vis 
proliferators, or stemming other potential proliferation temptation. What 
we do argue, however, is that sanctions alone will not be sufficient to 
compel denuclearization in North Korea. Even in Iran, where sanctions 
were particularly effective, lifting them was exchanged for a significant 
nuclear rollback, but not CVID. This therefore suggests that Seoul and 
Washington need to be prepared for more complex and arduous condi-
tions than what Tehran and Washington had to endure before the 2015 
nuclear deal. A process of such negotiation will not always be popular 
in many policy circles in Washington and Seoul. If the Iran deal in 2015 
has any lessons for North Korea, however, it is that compromises and 
risks made the negotiations successful in finding a mutually acceptable 
agreement.
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1. On May 9, 2018, President Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action. The decision lies outside the scope of our article 
since the focus is on why the United States and Iran were able to reach a nuclear 
deal in 2015, but not how to keep an agreement after circumstances have seemingly 
changed. Furthermore, this can be conceptualized as a new round of bargaining 
where political and economic conditions differ from the one of 2012–2015. 
2. We note that there are several estimates for North Korea’s trade dependence. 
We chose estimates by Kim (2017) for two reasons. First, they are the most up-to-
date data gathered through one of the most thorough and rigorous processes. See 
Kim (2017, 161–173) for the methodology. Second, his estimate represents a higher 
end for Pyongyang’s trade dependence, presenting the hardest case to our analysis. 
If North Korea’s economic vulnerability is comparable to the one of Iran under the 
roughly equal level of trade dependence, our sequential model must be able to show 
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what other factors contributed to the failure of nuclear inhibition. If we use low esti-
mates instead, a story can potentially become rather simplistic. An isolated economy 
makes sanctions difficult to succeed. 
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